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Conflicting claims in the eurozone?
Austerity’s myopia and the need for
a European Federal Union in a
post-Keynesian eurozone
center–periphery model
Alberto Botta*
Department of Law and Economics, Mediterranean University of Reggio Calabria, Italy
In this paper we study the role of the eurozone’s institutional design in determining the
sovereign debt crisis of the peripheral euro countries by means of a post-Keynesian euro-
zone center–periphery model. Within this framework, three points are formally addressed:
(1) the incomplete nature of the eurozone with respect to a fully fledged federal union has
significantly contributed to generating diverging trends and conflicting claims between
central and peripheral eurozone countries in the aftermath of the 2007–2008 financial
meltdown; (2) center–periphery diverging trends may disappear and a systemic crisis
may occur should financial turbulences deepen in big peripheral economies, possibly
spreading to the center; and (3) fiscal austerity does not address the core problems of
the eurozone. The creation of a European federal government, capable of implementing
anti-cyclical fiscal policies through a federal budget, and of a government banker consti-
tutes the most promising solution to stabilize the macroeconomic picture of peripheral
countries and to tackle the crisis. The unlimited bond-buying program recently launched
by the ECB is a positive albeit mild step in the right direction away from the extreme mon-
etarism that has shaped eurozone institutions thus far.
Keywords: eurozone debt crisis, post-Keynesian center–periphery model
JEL codes: E02, H63
1 INTRODUCTION
Since 2010, economists have devoted increasing efforts to explaining the causes of the
eurozone crisis, and to possibly finding a way out. Various opinions have emerged.
Among them, some economists indicate the ‘original sins in the European Monetary
Union (EMU) institutional setup’ (Papadimitriou and Wray 2012) as decisive factors
which have deepened the current crisis. In 1999, eurozone countries lost monetary
* Email: abotta@eco.unipv.it. I am indebted to Antoine Godin, Clara Capelli, Alberto Russo,
Alessia Lo Turco, and two anonymous referees whose comments have significantly improved
previous versions of this paper. Of course, I am responsible for any remaining errors.
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sovereignty by adopting the same currency and issuing debt in a currency that they do
not control. Furthermore, in the EMU there is no federal institution to support member
states in the event of severe economic downturns. Indeed, the EMU works ‘much like
a US with a FED, but with only individual state treasuries. It would be as if each EMU
member country were to attempt to operate fiscal policy in a foreign currency; deficit
spending will require borrowing in that foreign currency according to the dictates of
private markets’ (Wray 1998, pp. 91–92). All these missing elements in the original
design of the EMU seriously expose member states to default risk (Papadimitriou
and Wray 2012), hence financial turbulences, which would hardly take place in econo-
mies that are monetarily sovereign (De Grauwe 2011). The most reasonable way to
solve the crisis is the reconciliation of fiscal and monetary policies through a European
federal government with monetary sovereignty and a European Central Bank (ECB)
acting as a government banker (Palley 2011).
In our view, the above observations cast light on some of the EMU’s peculiarities that
contribute to making the eurozone vulnerable to financial turmoil. Second, it may
explain why a sovereign debt crisis has affected the peripheral eurozone countries
even though their performance in terms of macroeconomic fundamentals is often similar
or even better than those of other, apparently safer, economies. In this paper, we aim at
providing formal support to the aforementioned perspective on the eurozone crisis. We
pursue two main goals. First, diverging trends between central and peripheral countries
may play a decisive role in defining EMU reforms in the near future. Here, we want to
provide a picture of such conflicting claims as emerged in the aftermath of the 2007–
2008 financial crisis; and we want to model the causal relationship connecting them
to the aforementioned deficiencies in the EMU original design. Second, we want to
show how the creation of a monetarily sovereign European federal union is probably
the decisive step ahead in solving the crisis and stabilizing the macroeconomic picture
of member states. We will compare such a scenario with the currently prevailing empha-
sis on fiscal austerity.
We present a post-Keynesian center–periphery eurozone model. The post-Keynesian
flavor of our model emerges in several ways and seems to be justified by two main facts.
First, there is some concern among economists as to austerity’s contractionary effects on
peripheral economies (Krugman 2012). Whilst this point can be hardly grasped by sup-
ply-side models, we try to get it by describing economic dynamics as demand-driven.
Second, eurozone financial turbulences seem to have all the features of an intertwined
sovereign-debt–bank crisis (Stockhammer 2012). Such financial turbulences can have
tremendous effects on eurozone economic performances. We provide a formal treatment
of this point through a Kaldor-type ‘effective credit demand’ argument. In our model, we
assume that financial distress on sovereign bonds may endanger the solidity of financial
institutions’ balance sheets. In turn, this may harm economic dynamics via restrictive
credit policies by financial institutions.
We adopt a center–periphery framework in light of the recently emerged divergences
between central and peripheral euro countries. We distinguish between a center–small
periphery scenario and a center–big periphery scenario. Our purpose is to assess whether
the crisis in the periphery could propagate to the center depending on the intensity of
center–periphery linkages. Center–periphery models are not new in the post-Keynesian
tradition. Hein et al. (2011) already presented a Thirlwall-type model that aimed to
address balance-of-payments disequilibria inside the eurozone. Considering the previous
works in this tradition, our model focuses on the financial side of the story. It focuses on
macroeconomic variables such as debt-to-GDP ratios, country-risk premia and interest-
rate spreads. Since 2010, these terms have entered everyday debates among citizens,
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economists and policymakers. Here we try to account for the importance these variables
seem to have recently acquired in determining economic dynamics and in defining
economic policies in eurozone countries.
2 DIVERGING TRENDS IN THE EUROZONE
Until 2007, signs of convergence between central and peripheral economies had emerged
in the eurozone. Relevant capital inflows to peripheral countries boosted growth and
allowed them to catch up with central economies. Zero-approaching interest-rate spreads
mirrored the confidence of financial markets in the solidity of peripheral countries’
development. However, remarkable structural asymmetries with respect to the center
were still present. Tables A1–A2 and Figures A1–A4 in Appendix A1 provide some
evidence on this point.
First, economic growth in peripheral economies was largely based on mounting,
likely unsustainable, housing booms. This was clear in Spain and Ireland. In 2006,
the share of the construction sector in Spanish GDP was three times higher than
that recorded in Germany (see Table A1). Center–periphery asymmetries were even
wider in the case of Greece and Portugal. Both economies are poorly integrated on
international goods markets and show a low propensity to export. Manufacturing is
considerably limited given their degree of development. By contrast, Table A1 con-
firms the strength of manufacturing in Germany and the much higher capability to
export which is characteristic of both large and small central economies.
Second, huge current account deficits emerged as a side-product of economic
booms in the periphery (see Figure A1). While peripheral economies were accumulat-
ing increasing external debt stocks, central economies’ foreign assets were rising much
faster than their liabilities. According to the IMF (2012), at the end of 2011, German
positive net investment foreign position (NIFP) amounted to 36 percent of GDP. With
the exception of Italy, in the same period all peripheral economies were registering
negative NIFPs far higher than 50 percent of GDP.
The 2007–2008 financial meltdown has clearly revealed the fragilities of the
peripheral euro economies. Although recession affected the entire EMU, downturns
were particularly severe in the peripheral countries that had previously experienced
housing booms. In the case of Greece and Portugal, a low propensity to export further
deepened the recession by impeding a quick export-led recovery. Furthermore, periph-
eral governments have had to massively intervene to prevent the collapse of the finan-
cial system and provide a safety net against widespread unemployment. As a result, as
seen in Figures A2 and A3, public deficits and debt stocks soared sharply, more inten-
sively in the periphery than in the center. Within such a gloomy scenario, financial
markets suddenly changed their minds. While peripheral euro countries have emerged
as the epicenter of worldwide financial instability, central economies have turned out
to be safe havens in the eyes of financial investors. Accordingly, liquidity has rapidly
dried up in the periphery and moved to the center. The previous convergence set the
stage for widening diversities. Interest rates in the periphery and center–periphery
spreads have increased astonishingly. Figure A4 shows the asymmetric reaction of
financial markets in the peripheral eurozone countries with respect to central econo-
mies, and other advanced countries in the aftermath of the 2007–2008 financial shock.
All these events seem to describe a standard center–periphery balance-of-payments
crisis taking place inside the eurozone (Hein et al. 2011; Perez-Caldentey and Vernengo
2012; Bibow 2012). While such a perspective gets some relevant aspects of the current
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difficulties in peripheral countries, there is something missing. Following De Grauwe
(2011), a look at macroeconomic data does not explain why financial turbulence is
afflicting a peripheral euro country like Spain and not the UK. Since 2007, economic
growth in the UK has been disappointing; public balance deficits have been generally
higher than those observed in Spain; the UK current account has persistently recorded
deficits; and the UK debt-to-GDP ratio is closely similar to the Spanish one. The same
doubts emerge if we compare the eurozone as a whole to the US. The crucial point
that can explain such a paradox may lie in the differences between the EMU and mon-
etarily sovereign countries in terms of the institutions designed to implement economic
policies. In particular, we refer to the absence of a eurozone federal government imple-
menting anti-cyclical fiscal policies, and of a fully fledged eurozone central bank acting
as a government banker (Palley 2011). Let’s try to discuss this point more formally.
2.1 A center–periphery eurozone model
Consider a well-developed center country and a relatively less-developed periphery
country. They share the same currency and have delegated monetary policy to a
common central bank. The two countries maintain complete fiscal independence con-
cerning anti-cyclical measures. Fiscal deficits are financed by issuing national treasury
bonds denominated in the same euro currency. There is no European federal fiscal
authority that imposes taxes, makes expenditures, or collects resources by issuing
federal bonds.
Some recent empirical analyses attribute emphasis to the Keynesian multiplier and
effective demand as relevant factors to explain the current crisis in several developed
countries (Corsetti et al. 2012). This approach goes hand-in-hand with the concern
about the contractionary effects of austerity in the eurozone (Krugman 2012). Accord-
ingly, in this paper I model economic activity in the center and in the periphery as
demand-driven. For the sake of simplicity, I follow Lavoie (2006) and assume an
IS-growth curve in which the growth rates of the center and the periphery are functions
of demand injections and leakages:
gC ¼ f C
!
GCðdCÞ; EXC; IC
!
PTC
!
iCðσCÞ
"
;PTP
!
iPðσPÞ
""
; θCðdCÞ
"
(1)
1
gP ¼ f P
!
GPðdPÞ; EXP; IP
!
PTP
!
iPðσPÞ
"
; PTC
!
iCðσCÞ
""
; θPðdPÞ
"
: (2)
Equations (1) and (2) show that the current growth rate of the center gC and of the
periphery gP positively depend on domestic public expenditures GC(GP), current net
exports EXC(EXP), and total investment IC(IP). θC and θP stand for fiscal policy para-
meters linked to taxation. The link between gC(gP) and θC(θP) is negative. An increase
in taxation in the center (periphery) – that is, a higher value of θC(θP) – reduces the
Keynesian multiplier and, ceteris paribus, the growth rate gC(gP).
1. In amore realistic discrete timemodel, we define current output (Yt) as: Y t¼mðI tþGtþEXtÞ,
where m stands for the Keynesian multiplier. Noting that Y t¼Yt−1ð1þgtÞ, we can write the
growth rate of real GDP at time t as: gt¼mðηIg
I
t þηGg
G
t þηEXg
EX
t Þ. In our formulation, g
I
t ; g
G
t
and gEXt are the growth rates of total investment (I), public expenditures (G) and economy’s
exports (EX); ηI, ηG and ηEX are the corresponding shares of GDP. Ceteris paribus, the higher
It, Gt and/or EXt, the better the growth performance of the economy as a whole.
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Equations (1) and (2) also read that a negative relationship might exist between the
growth rates gC and gP, and the debt-to-GDP ratios dC and dP, respectively. In this
paper, however, such a relationship does not represent any alleged ‘natural’ negative
effect of (high) debt-to-GDP ratios on economic growth, as was purported by Reinhart
and Rogoff (2010) in their largely criticized empirical analysis.2 Rather, it ought to be
conceived as a policy-induced relationship that emerges from the eurozone institutional
rules regulating euro countries’ fiscal policies. Following Taylor et al. (2012), the EMU
seems to be currently engulfed by a sort of hysteria to reduce public debts. These feel-
ings emerge clearly from the Maastricht Treaty and the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact,
and are even strengthened by the fiscal compact. The fiscal compact imposes tough fis-
cal corrections and huge public debt cuts in countries with high debt-to-GDP ratios. It
also gives slightly more space for implementing expansionary policies to minimally
indebted economies. According to Keynesian lines, these prescriptions can have a strong
impact on the economic activity of the eurozone via public expenditure cuts and/or
increasing taxation. The formulation of Equations (1) and (2) aims at modeling these
feelings, and their possible implications on economic growth in the EMU.
According to the endogenousmonetary theory, investment does not come from savings.
On the one hand, investment depends on entrepreneurs’ animal spirits. On the other hand,
investment is affected by banks’ credit policies, which define the effective demand for
credit on the soundness of banks’ assets. With this in mind, Equation (1) assumes that
economic growth in the center is indirectly affected by the prices of both center and per-
iphery governments’ bonds, (PTC) and (P
T
P) respectively, which in turn depend negatively
on the interest rates iC and iP. Changing the prices of governments’ bonds will alter the
solidity of banks’ balance sheets and therefore their credit policy. Investment demand will
inevitably be affected by easing or tightening conditions on the credit market.
Peripheral euro countries are net receivers of foreign capital. Yet, big peripheral
economies such as Spain and Italy have accumulated significant asset positions in
the center (Waysand et al. 2010). Accordingly, Equation (2) assumes both peripheral
and central bonds to be in the balance sheets of peripheral banks and therefore to influ-
ence, via banks’ credit policy, domestic investment IP.
In Equations (1) and (2), interest rates iC and iP are influenced by σC and σP, respec-
tively. In our model, they represent country-specific risk indicators that financial
operators assign to assets issued by eurozone countries. Parameter σC represents the
risk perceived by financial markets in acquiring a central economy government’s
bond. Parameter σP encompasses all the country-specific factors taken into account
by financial investors when buying a peripheral government’s bond. Such country-
specific factors influence the remuneration gained on bonds’ holdings. In particular,
they determine the spread between the interest rate iC(iP) and the interest rate i
* associated
with a third-country riskless financial asset, say US government Treasury Bills. This point
is modeled in Equations (3) and (4):3
iC ¼ i
% þ σC (3)
2. See Herndon et al. (2013) for a detailed critique of the empirical analysis carried out in
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010).
3. For the sake of simplicity, we neglect the euro–dollar exchange rate risk in Equations (3)
and (4). We do this in order to stress the relevance of financial transactions among different euro
countries’ bonds instead of capital flights from eurozone assets towards third-countries’ financial
activities. In this sense, it is worth noting the fairly small devaluation of the euro with respect to
the dollar, in spite of the considerable distress afflicting European financial markets since 2010.
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iP ¼ i
% þ σP: (4)
In this paper, we model inflation at country level in a standard accelerationist
fashion:
πC ¼ π
T þ ψðgC − g
n
CÞ (5)
πP ¼ π
T þ χðgP − g
n
PÞ: (6)
Equation (5) reads that the current inflation in the center πC is equal to the inflation
target πT established by the ECB in the event that current growth gC is equal to the cen-
tral economy potential growth rate gnC .
4 Should gC be higher (lower) than g
n
C , inflation in
the center will be higher (lower) than the long-run inflation rate pursued by European
monetary authorities. The same line of reasoning applies to Equation (6), which defines
current inflation in the periphery πP. In Equation (6), g
n
P stands for potential growth in
the periphery. Parameters ψ and χ represent the sensitivity of inflation dynamics to the
output gap in the center and the periphery.
Once gC, gP, iC, iP, πC and πP are defined in Equations (1)–(6), the medium-to-long
run dynamics of the model comes from Equations (7)–(10). Equations (7) and (8)
describe the dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio dC
5 and of the country-risk factor
σC in the center:
_dC ¼ dCðcDC − πC − gCÞ
¼ dC
ΩC
#
GCðdCÞ; θCðdCÞ; gCðGC; θCÞ
$
dC
þ iC − π
T − ð1þ ψÞgC þ ψg
n
C
24 35 (7)
_σC ¼ β
!
dC − dC ðd
%
CðσCÞ; εPÞ
"
(8)
with dC ¼ d
%
C if εP ¼ 0; dC > d
%
C if εP > 0.
Equation (7) defines the time derivative of the central economy’s debt-to-GDP
ratio _dC . According to the term in square parentheses, _dC is a positive function of
ΩC
dC
; with ΩC as the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio. The primary deficit ΩC depends
on public expenditures GC, the tax parameter θC, and the current growth rate gC.
Higher public expenditures can stimulate economic growth, thus inducing higher
tax revenues and lower deficits. Nevertheless, such an indirect negative effect of GC
on ΩC is likely to be smaller than its direct positive impact via government outlays.
Here we assume an overall positive link between ΩC and GC to exist. By contrast,
the primary deficit ΩC is a negative function of the tax parameter θC, and of the current
growth rate gC.
4. In this paper, we assume gn to be exogenous in order to allow the model to remain math-
ematically tractable. Yet it could be endogenized, so that gnC ¼ gC; g
n
P ¼ gP, and π
T ¼ πC ¼ πP
in the long run. See León-Ledesma and Thirlwall (2002), Lavoie (2006), and Botta (2013) on
this point.
5. In Equation (7), cDC is the percentage variation in the central economy’s debt stock.
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In Equation (7), _dC is positively affected by the interest rate iC. Ceteris paribus, the
higher iC is, the higher the service cost of outstanding debt and the need for new bond
issuances will be, hence _dC . On the contrary, a higher inflation target π
T and a faster
economic growth gC will reduce dC by raising the nominal GDP via real and nominal
channels. Finally, a negative link exists between _dC and the potential growth rate g
n
C.
Ceteris paribus, the higher gnC and the connected output gap are, the lower domestic
inflation or the higher the risk of deflation will be. A Fisher-type debt-deflation process
could take place, destabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio.
Equation (8) describes how financial operators may periodically update the financial
risk indicator attached to the center. We assume the central economy’s risk indicator to
be revised by confronting the outstanding debt-to-GDP ratio dC with some benchmark
level dC . According to Equation (8), if dC is higher (lower) than the benchmark level dC ,
financial operators will increase (reduce) the financial risk indicator σC, so that _σC > 0
( _σC < 0). Parameter β stands for the sensitivity of financial operators’ feelings to any gap
between the current debt-to-GDP ratio and the benchmark level dC .
In this model we assume that the debt-to-GDP target dC positively depends on two
factors: d%C and εP. First, d
%
C is the debt-to-GDP ratio consistent with the economy
growing at full potential. It represents the sort of long-run equilibrium level of the
debt-to-GDP ratio the economy will tend to reach once growth is at the potential
rate gnC and, consequently, primary deficit is at its structural level. The full potential
debt-to-GDP ratio is defined as d%C ¼
Ω%C
ðgn
C
þ πT − i% − σCÞ
, where Ω%C is the primary deficit-
to-GDP ratio at its structural level.
In times of financial stability, we assume financial operators will set the benchmark
level dC equal to the full potential debt-to-GDP ratio d
%
C (that is, εP = 0). However, in
times of financial distress, financial operators may also consider ‘exogenous’ factors to
evaluate financial risks in the center. Assume, for instance, that some bad news were to
come from the periphery: as a consequence of the 2007–2008 financial shock, the per-
iphery is experiencing a deep recession and large public balance deficits. Financial
operators may start to worry about the structural weaknesses of the periphery, even
though they had been mostly neglected in times of bonanza. Capital may rapidly
leave the periphery in search of a safe haven in the center. In Equation (8), the term
εP aims to get this point. In times of financial distress, we assume εP to become posi-
tive. Financial operators increase the benchmark level dC . Regardless of the gap
between dC and d
%
C, and of the effective financial solidity of the center, financial mar-
kets will move capital away from the periphery and towards the center and reduce the
center’s risk factor σC.
Equations (9) and (10) correspond to Equations (7) and (8), and now refer to the
periphery:
_dP ¼ dPðcDP − πP − gPÞ
¼ dP
ΩP
!
GPðdPÞ; θPðdPÞ; gPðGP; θPÞ
"
dP
þ iP − π
T − ð1þ χÞgP þ ψg
n
P
" # (9)
_σP ¼ δ
!
dP − dPðd
%
PðσPÞ; εPÞ
"
(10)
with dP ¼ d
%
P if εP ¼ 0; dP < d
%
P if εP > 0.
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Equations (9) and (10) describe the dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio dP and of the
country-risk factor σP in the periphery along similar lines as those assumed in the cen-
ter. Note, however, that there is a fundamental asymmetry. Actually, adverse shocks
hitting the periphery (that is, εP > 0) will be immediately passed through a value of
dP lower than d
%
P. Accordingly, huge capital outflows will take place and the periph-
ery’s financial risk indicator σP will be revised upward.
Equations (7)–(10) give rise to a complex four-equation dynamic system. In order
to keep our analysis as simple as possible, for the time being let’s consider the sets of
equations (7)–(8) and (9)–(10) as independent, except for the ‘shock’ term εP. Further,
let us focus on the stability analysis on the center only, and analyse the Jacobian matrix
JC (evaluated at the steady state). We report a detailed mathematical analysis of
dynamic stability in the center in Appendix A2. Figure 1 below describes the econ-
omic dynamics in the center graphically.
The top-right panel in Figure 1 portrays the two loci for constant values of the debt-
to-GDP ratio dC and country risk factor σC. The ð _dC ¼ 0Þ locus is an inverted
U-shaped curve. The ð _σC ¼ 0Þ locus is an upward sloping curve with a horizontal
asymptote when σC ¼ ðg
n
C þ π
T − i%Þ and dC ¼ d
%
C ¼
Ω%
C
ðgn
C
þ πT − i% − σCÞ
¼ ∞. Further,
we assume it to have a horizontal segment, with σC = 0, when dC is lower than
d%CðσC¼0Þ ¼
Ω%
C
ðgn
C
þ πT − i%Þ
.
Note two intersection points, hence the possibility for multiple equilibria to exist.
Equilibrium A features a lower debt-to-GDP ratio dC
1, a lower country-specific risk indi-
cator σC
1 and a higher growth rate gC
1 than the records associated with equilibrium B.
Furthermore, while point A shows stable dynamics in its neighborhoods, equilibrium B
is unstable. Equilibrium B may represent a sort of risky economic environment, the
ic ic
1ic
2 dc
1 dc
2 dc
gc
1
gc
2
dc
*
(σc = 0)
σ⋅c = 0
dc = 0
σc1
σc2
σc
gc
i
A
B
Figure 1 The case for multiple long-run equilibria
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pre-crisis Greek context for instance, in which a temporary economic shock may well be
enough to generate explosive dynamics in the debt-to-GDP ratio.
Moving counter-clockwise in Figure 1, the remaining panels describe the economic
mechanisms connecting dC to gC. In the top-left panel, we portray Equation (3). In
the bottom-left panel, we depict the IS-growth curve, shown as a concave curve. This
representation may be consistent with some recent empirical evidence on a variable
Keynesian multiplier featuring higher values during financial crises and economic reces-
sions (Corsetti et al. 2012). Accordingly, the higher iC due to financial turbulences on the
market for bonds, the deeper the economic recession will be due to a reduction in invest-
ment IC and a sharp (negative) multiplicative effect on the overall effective demand.
In the bottom-right panelwematchdebt-to-GDP ratios andGDPgrowth rates associated
with long-run equilibria. Once again, note that the negative relationship between gC and dC,
the number of the equilibria, and their stability properties mostly depend on the current
eurozone political–institutional ‘paranoia’ about public debt reduction, and on the incom-
plete eurozone’s institutional design with respect to a monetarily sovereign political
entity. First, tough austerity packages (that is, lower values of GC(GP) and/or higher
values of θC(θp)), as imposed by European rules on fiscal discipline in the presence of
high debt-to-GDP ratios, can produce a huge drop in the growth rate gC, in particular
when fiscal retrenchment is implemented during recessions. The ensuing reduction
in the primary deficit ΩC may not be enough to significantly cut (ΩC/dC) if the debt-
to-GDP ratio is too high. Eventually, too much emphasis on debt cuts generates the
downward-sloping arm in the locus for ð _dC ¼ 0Þ, hence the unstable dynamics portrayed
in Figure 1. Second, financial markets would not react nervously to increasing debt-to-
GDP ratios should public debt issuances be largely centralized at a federal European
level, and be possibly supported by the action of a government central banker.
It is easy to see that the policy implications of our framework are opposite with
respect to those put forward by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). First, public debt manage-
ment may not be a priority in peripheral eurozone countries, and austerity is likely to
turn out to be a self-defeating measure to ensure fiscal solidity. By contrast, a more
gradual approach to fiscal imbalance and higher attention in sustaining growth
could avoid the negative link between gC and dC, and strengthen macroeconomic stab-
ility. Second, the current sovereign debt crisis can successfully be tackled if the euro-
zone undertakes all the steps needed to become a monetarily sovereign political entity.
In this case, an upward-sloping locus for ð _dC ¼ 0Þ could emerge in Figure 1. It might
cross a much flatter locus for ð _σC ¼ 0Þ once or three times, giving rise to one or more
stable equilibria. In both cases, faster economic growth would be more likely achieved,
and explosive dynamics in the debt-to-GDP ratio avoided.
3 CENTER–PERIPHERY DYNAMICS AFTER THE 2007–2008 FINANCIAL
MELTDOWN
3.1 The center–small periphery case
Let’s now consider the implications of our model in terms of center–periphery
dynamics. Let’s consider a center–small periphery scenario first.
Imagine a large central economy – Germany – and a small periphery – Greece.
According to the empirical evidence on the eurozone, imagine that economic
links between the two countries are weak. First, reciprocal export flows amount to
a negligible proportion of their own total exports, so that
∂gC
∂EXC
∂EXC
∂EXC ! SP
¼ 0
# $
and
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∂gP
∂EXSP
∂EXSP
∂EXSP ! C
¼ 0
# $
:6 Second, even though overall financial markets’ response to bad
news in the periphery can have significant economic consequences, direct center–
periphery financial links are negligible. Assume the center economy’s foreign assets
in the small periphery do not have much weight in center financial institutions’
balance sheets, so that
∂gC
∂IC
# $
∂IC
∂PT
P
# $
¼ 0:7 Apply this line of reasoning also to the
small periphery’s asset holdings in the center, so that
∂gP
∂IP
# $
∂IP
∂PT
C
# $
¼ 0.
Now assume that the 2007–2008 financial shock occurs, curtailing growth and
increasing public deficits in both economies. In a two-country version of Figure 1,
such events induce both loci for ð _dC ¼ 0Þ and ð _dP ¼ 0Þ to move downward due to
reductions in gC and gP, and increases in ΩC and ΩP. However, due to center–periphery
asymmetries, the economic downturn in the periphery is deeper and lasts longer com-
pared to recession in the center. The periphery’s public finances register deeper imbal-
ances than abroad. Accordingly, the locus for ð _dP ¼ 0Þ will move far further down than
the locus for ð _dC ¼ 0Þ will do. We depict these facts in Figures 2a and 2b.
Furthermore, capital markets do not react neutrally to the common center–periphery
shock. In Equations (8) and (9), factor εP assumes a positive value. In the periphery, an
upward revision of factor σP will take place. Central economy bonds, by contrast, will
σP
σPB
σPC
σPA
dPA dPC
A
C B
dPB dP
(dP = 0)
.
(σP = 0)
.
Figure 2a A center–small periphery scenario: long-run dynamics in the small
periphery
6. EXC→SP(EXSP→C) stands for the center’s (small periphery’s) exports towards the small
periphery (center).
7. By September 2011, according to the Joint External Debt Hub (JEDH), German banks’
exposure in Italy and Spain amounted to 67 percent of overall German security holdings in per-
ipheral countries. In light of this evidence, the above assumptions must be seen in a comparative
perspective as a way to remark differences between a soft crisis scenario, in which small periph-
eral countries only risk default, and a much more worrisome crisis in which financial turbulences
dramatically increase in big peripheral economies as well.
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get higher ratings and the country-risk factor σC will decrease. Graphically, such asym-
metric behaviors of financial markets are depicted through opposite movements in the
loci for ð _σP ¼ 0Þ and ð _σC ¼ 0Þ. In Figure 2a, the locus for ð _σP ¼ 0Þ will move to the
left. In Figure 2b, the locus for ð _σC ¼ 0Þ will shift to the right.
At the end of the day, a higher public deficit (higher values of ΩP), economic reces-
sion (a lower gP), and financial turbulences (εP > 0) all induce substantial increases in
the debt-to-GDP ratio dP, and in the risk factor σP in the periphery. As a consequence
of the initial shock, the periphery seriously risks a permanent move from equilibrium A
to the new equilibrium C, in which much higher interest rates will go hand-in-hand
with far lower growth rates compared to the pre-crisis period.
Even worse, should the periphery be initially located in the unstable equilibrium B,
as perhaps is the case with Greece, the above events could generate destabilizing
dynamics and eventually lead the country to bankruptcy. Note that this could also hap-
pen in seemingly safer countries, such as Spain and Ireland, in the event that financial
markets’ reactions to the crisis were so strong as to lead the two loci for ð _σP ¼ 0Þ and
ð _dP ¼ 0Þ to no longer intersect. A set of conditions leading to such an event reads:
Ω%P
ðgnP þ π
T − i%Þ
<
ΩP
½ð1þ ψÞgP þ πT − i% −ψgnP'
and
−
∂ΩP
∂dP
% &
dP −ΩP
d2P
− ð1þ ψÞ
∂gP
∂dP
2664
3775
1þ
∂ΩP
∂gP
% &
∂gP
∂σP
% &
dP
− ð1þ ψÞ
∂gP
∂σP
2664
3775
<
1
Ω%P
ðgnP þ π
T − i% − σPÞ
2
" # :
σC
σCB
σCA
σCC
dCA
dPC
dCB dC
C
A
B
(dC = 0)
.
(σC = 0)
.
Figure 2b A center–small periphery scenario: long-run dynamics in the center
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The above two conditions tell us that the lower the structural primary deficit ΩP
*,
perhaps as established by the European authorities into the fiscal compact, the more
likely is overall instability to occur. Further, tough austerity packages that sharply
hamper growth (that is, high values of ð∂gP=∂dPÞ), and severe effects of financial
turmoil on the real side of the economy (that is, high values of ð∂gP=∂σPÞ) are all con-
ducive to a highly unstable economic environment. Austerity may turn out to be a
source of instability, rather than its remedy.
In the center, a radically different picture emerges. The crisis-driven downward
movement in the locus for ð _dC ¼ 0Þ can induce the debt-to-GDP ratio to increase.
However, capital flights towards the center may tame such a trend. A slightly increas-
ing debt-to-GDP ratio may paradoxically combine with a lower country risk factor,
easing conditions on credit markets and causing growth to rebound. This is depicted
in Figure 2b. It resembles well what is going on in a large central economy such as
Germany. Thanks to the abundance of liquidity on domestic financial markets,
German Bunds’ interest rates are at never-seen-before low values, and a considerable
economic recovery has occurred in 2010 and 2011. The German debt-to-GDP ratio
seems to have stabilized at around 83 percent since 2010. The center’s (positive) econ-
omic performance with respect to the small periphery appears clearly.
3.2 The center–big periphery case
Now consider a much more complex center–big periphery scenario. First, trade relation-
ships between the two countries are likely stronger than in the case of the small periph-
ery. Indeed, economic recession in Italy will likely have significant negative effects on
economic dynamics in Germany. In our model, this implies that
∂gC
∂EXC
∂EXC
∂EXC ! BP
> 0
# $
8
and vice versa. Second, the central economy’s asset holdings in the big periphery are
much more substantial than those in the small economies. Therefore, the financial sys-
tem of the center will be hardly immune to a mounting crisis in the periphery. A perverse
cycle between bankruptcies in the periphery and financial dislocation in the center will
probably take place, with obvious negative consequences on investment in both econo-
mies. Accordingly, we assume
∂gC
∂IC
# $
∂IC
∂PT
P
# $
> 0 and
∂gP
∂IP
# $
∂IP
∂PT
C
# $
> 0.
We formally analyse the center–big periphery dynamics in Appendix A3. What
emerges from our analysis is that overall stability cannot be assured in a center–big per-
iphery context. Both systems could be stable if considered individually. Instability, how-
ever, is likely to emerge due to the financial links connecting the two countries. The more
financially integrated countries are and the more exposed single-country credit institu-
tions are to financial turbulences in the partner country, the higher the likelihood that
financial instability in the big periphery will extend to the center. We depict such an
event in Figures 3a and 3b, where the onset of the crisis follows the same lines seen
in the case of a small periphery. However, initial center–periphery divergences may
be rapidly replaced by similar dynamics. This happens when degrading financial condi-
tions in the periphery start to impinge upon financial institutions’ solidity in the center,
hence curtailing economic growth gC, and raising public balance disequilibria ΩC. In
Figures 3a and 3b, such perverse mechanisms are represented by a sequence of down-
ward movements in the two loci for ð _dC ¼ 0Þ and ð _dP ¼ 0Þ, which will now feed back
into each other and spread financial and economic crisis in the overall eurozone. If such
8. EC→BP(EBP→C) stands for center (peripheral) exports towards the big periphery (center).
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zone economy. The remarkable economic slowdown registered in 2012 in the center
might perhaps be a result, at least partially, of deep recessions in big peripheral countries.
4 AUSTERITY’S MYOPIA AND THE NEED FOR A EUROPEAN
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Diverging trends among eurozone countries may play a decisive role in defining which
kind of reforms European institutionswill adopt to solve the crisis. Should the crisis persist
only in the periphery, it might be perceived as a periphery-specific issue. Accordingly,
fiscal restrictions in the periphery, such as those prescribed by the fiscal compact, may
appear as the best solution to the crisis (European Central Bank 2012). By contrast, the
σP
σPB
σPC
σPA
dPA dP
(dP = 0)
.
(σP = 0)
.
A
Figure 3a The periphery’s financial instability in the center–big periphery case
σC
σCB
σCA
σCC
dCA dCB dC
(dC = 0)
.
(σC = 0)
.
A
Figure 3b The center’s financial instability in the center–big periphery case
Conflicting claims in a post-Keynesian eurozone center–periphery model 57
© 2014 The Author Journal compilation © 2014 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
A
uthor's A
ccepted M
anuscript
diffusion of the crisis to the center may favor the adoption of a wider reform agenda. It
may pave the way towards the creation of a European federal union, admitting more
space for a federal expansionary fiscal policy. Let’s evaluate these alternatives.
4.1 Long-run effects of the fiscal compact
The fiscal compact dictates that eurozone countries must have a structural balance def-
icit no higher than 0.5 percent of GDP. This ceiling increases to 1 percent of GDP in the
case of countries with a debt lower than 60 percent of GDP. Thus, the fiscal compact
does not exclude, a priori, expansionary fiscal stances to be adopted in extraordinary
cases. Nevertheless, it reiterates stronger than ever before the balanced budget principle
as the general rule that eurozone countries must follow. First, such a rule must be
enforced through member states’ laws, preferably in constitutional laws. Second, fiscal
deficits must be temporary and short-lived, even in the case of temporary deviations jus-
tified by extraordinary circumstances.
In our model, the adoption of the fiscal compact modifies the shape of the two loci
for ð _σC ¼ 0Þ and ð _σP ¼ 0Þ, which depend on primary structural deficits ΩC
* and ΩP
*,
and on the way they must react to fulfill the fiscal compact’s restrictions. Let’s assume
the fiscal compact applies in the most severe version (structural deficit-to-GDP ratios
no higher than 0.5 percent),9 so that:
Ω%C þ ði
% þ σCÞdC ≤ 0;005!Ω
%
C ≤ 0;005− ði
% þ σCÞdC! d
%
C
¼
Ω%C
ðgnC þ π
T − i% − σCÞ
≤
0;005− ði% þ σCÞdC
ðgnC þ π
T − i% − σCÞ
Ω%P þ ði
% þ σPÞdP ≤ 0;005!Ω
%
P ≤ 0;005− ði
% þ σPÞdP! d
%
P ¼
Ω%P
ðgnP þ π
T − i% − σPÞ
≤
0;005− ði% þ σPÞdP
ðgnP þ π
T − i% − σPÞ
:
Replace the above expressions for dC
* and dP
* in the two loci for ð _σC ¼ 0Þ and
ð _σP ¼ 0Þ. For the sake of simplicity, assume that the above inequalities hold with strict
equality signs. We obtain:
ð _σP ¼ 0Þ if dP ¼ d
%
P ¼
0;005− ði% þ σPÞdP
ðgnP þ π
T − i% − σPÞ
;
hence: dP ¼
0;005
ðgnP þ π
TÞ
!
_σP < 0 if dP <
0;005
ðgnP þ π
TÞ
_σP ¼ 0 if dP ¼
0;005
ðgnP þ π
TÞ
_σP > 0 if dP >
0;005
ðgnP þ π
TÞ
8>>>>><>>>>:
9. By the end of 2012, twelve out of the seventeen eurozone countries have debt stocks higher
than 60 percent of GDP.
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ð _σC ¼ 0Þ if dC ¼ d
%
C ¼
0;005− ði% þ σCÞdC
ðgnC þ π
T − i% − σCÞ
;
hence: dC ¼
0;005
ðgnC þ π
TÞ
!
_σC < 0 if dC <
0;005
ðgnC þ π
TÞ
_σC ¼ 0 if dC ¼
0;005
ðgnC þ π
TÞ
_σC > 0 if dC >
0;005
ðgnC þ π
TÞ
:
8>>>>><>>>>>:
In Figures 4a and 4b, under the provisions of the fiscal compact, the loci for ð _σP ¼ 0Þ
and ð _σC ¼ 0Þ now take shape as vertical lines. Furthermore, they lie close to the vertical
axis due to the extremely low margins imposed onto structural balance deficits.
In Figure 4a, the periphery’s risk factor will decrease for values of the debt-to-GDP
ratio that lie on the left side of the locus for ð _σP ¼ 0Þ. Opposite dynamics will emerge
should dC be higher than the threshold level (0,005/(gP
n + πT)). A similar line of reas-
oning applies to the center (see Figure 4b).
Once again, in the event of a global recession, the two loci for ð _dC ¼ 0Þ and ð _dP ¼ 0Þ
will move downwards. In the periphery, huge capital outflows will move the locus for
ð _σP ¼ 0Þ to the left. In the center, the ‘flight to quality’ will move the locus for ð _σC ¼ 0Þ
to the right. In a center–big periphery scenario, there is still the concrete possibility that
overall instability would take place in the eurozone. Graphically, such a scenario corres-
ponds to the case in which the two curves for ð _dP ¼ 0Þ and ð _dC ¼ 0Þ lie on the right of
the two loci for ð _σP ¼ 0Þ and ð _σC ¼ 0Þ, respectively. A sufficient condition for the
eurozone’s instability to occur reads:
0;005
ðgnP þ π
TÞ
<
ΩP
ðgP þ πP − i%Þ
and
0;005
ðgnC þ π
TÞ
<
ΩC
ðgC þ πC − i%Þ
:
σP
σPB
dPA dPdP = dP*
A
B
(dP = 0)
.
(σP = 0)
.
Figure 4a The periphery’s financial instability in the presence of the fiscal compact
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According to our analysis, the implementation of the fiscal compact increases over-
all instability instead of reducing it. First, excessive binding constraints on structural
deficits can exacerbate financial markets’ reactions in the event of larger-than-expected
public balance disarrays. Second, the automatic fiscal correction mechanisms envis-
aged by the fiscal compact may trigger a perverse fallacy of composition phenomenon.
In the presence of a systemic recession, all eurozone countries will simultaneously
implement fiscal corrections. Austerity in the big periphery will jeopardize growth
in the center, which, in turn, due to its own stabilization package, will reduce economic
activity in the periphery. This event emerges clearly from Equations (11) and (12), in
which we show how growth rates in the center and in the periphery react to fiscal
restrictions, and are influenced by the economic activity in the partner country
(‘hat’ variables stand for percentage variations):
cgC ¼ ϵgC;GC cGC þ ϵgC ;θCcθC þ ϵgC ;gP bgP (11)
bgP ¼ ϵgP;GPcGP þ ϵgP;θP bθP þ ϵgP;gCcgC (12)
with ϵgC;GC ; ϵgP;GP ; ϵgC ;gP ; ϵgP;gC > 0; ϵgC ;θC ; ϵgP;θP < 0.
In Equations (11) and (12), ϵ stands for growth rates’ elasticities to fiscal policy vari-
ables, and to the partner countries’ economic activity. In a center–big periphery scenario,
fiscal correction in a single economy (that is, cGC and cGP < 0; cθC and cθP > 0) will
impinge upon economic activity in the partner country via the ‘foreign growth’ terms
ðϵgC ;gP
cgPÞ and ðϵgP;gC cgCÞ. Eventually, the obsession with fiscal austerity will result in
a eurozone center–periphery lose–lose game.
4.2 Stabilization through a European federal fiscal policy
Consider an alternative reform agenda, whose final goal is the creation of a fully
fledged European federal entity. Two aspects are fundamental. First, the creation of
σC
σCB
dC A dCdC = dC
*
A
B
(dC = 0)
.
(σC = 0)
.
Figure 4b The cente ’s financial instability in the presence of the fiscal compact
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a European federal government which can dispose of a considerable federal budget
and run anti-cyclical fiscal policies that could be financed by issuing European Treas-
ury Bonds. Second, the reformation of the current ECB statute, thus creating a central
bank that could operate as a government banker.
In our model, fiscal expansion carried out by a European federal government by
means of a federal budget is represented as a (positive) external factor in the macro-
economic picture of central and peripheral economies. This kind of intervention
would have three main consequences. First, the costs of anti-cyclical measures and
of financial institutions’ rescue packages will largely move from national balances
to the European federal budget. Accordingly, in the equations for ð _dP ¼ 0Þ and
ð _dC ¼ 0Þ, member states’ primary balances ΩP and ΩC would be mostly unaffected
by the recession. Second, growth could recover more quickly in the center and in
the periphery, and it will not be harmed by austerity packages. In the two equations
for ð _dP ¼ 0Þ and ð _dC ¼ 0Þ, gP and gC could be thought to remain broadly unchanged,
with positive implications on the solidity of national public balances via the revenue
side of public accounts. Ultimately, these facts all work to stabilize the two loci for
ð _dP ¼ 0Þ and ð _dC ¼ 0Þ, which would remain in about the same original position.
A third indirect side-effect of federal fiscal measures is the stabilization of financial
markets. Thanks to the intervention of the European federal government, fiscal stimuli
to economic activity will not burden national government balances any longer. Con-
sequentially, no fear of national government insolvency will upset financial markets.
Speculative forces will not gain strength; liquidity will not dry up in the periphery
and move to the center. In our model, the ‘shock’ εP term could be neutralized. The
two loci for ð _σP ¼ 0Þ and ð _σC ¼ 0Þ would remain stable and not move asymmetri-
cally. The country-risk factors associated with the eurozone countries would not be
revised upward.
Expansionary fiscal policies carried out by a European federal government may
render single eurozone countries largely immune from the financial consequences of
deep recessions. Yet some may argue that considerable Eurobond-financed fiscal def-
icits may now emerge at the federal level. Could this create a new round of financial
turbulences? According to Palley (2011), this event will not occur in the presence of an
ECB acting as a government banker. In such an institutional framework, the ECB
could act in the same way as the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England cur-
rently do. It could intervene promptly to back Eurobonds’ issuances, reduce interest
rates and restore financial tranquility in the event of financial distress on the market
for Eurobonds. In the presence of such an option, Eurobonds would be hardly sub-
jected to speculative attacks. On the contrary, following De Grauwe (2011), they
may appear safe assets in which financial operators may invest money, as long as
recession has ended and private assets have returned to the favor of financial operators.
Monetary policies that aim at preventing financial turbulences on a possibly near-
to-come Eurobonds market do not correspond to any precise variable in our center–
periphery framework. Yet, from a logical point of view, they might be described as
broadly similar to the unlimited bond-buying program the ECB has recently launched,
which aims at helping an easier public balance management in member states by red-
ucing debt service costs. In our model, such kinds of intervention obviously affect
financial markets’ behavior, hence the revision of the country-specific risk factors
σP and σC. Once again, the ECB’s intervention against sovereign debt default will
likely induce the ‘shock’ term εP to lose relevance in the equations for ð _σPÞ and
ð _σC Þ. Further, the sensitivity parameters β and δ may assume zero-approaching values:
financial operators may be induced not to increase σP and σC in response to increasing
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debt-to-GDP ratios in central and peripheral economies. Graphically, the two loci for
ð _σP ¼ 0Þ and ð _σC ¼ 0Þ would now assume a pretty flat shape, perhaps horizontal lines
corresponding to the horizontal axis in the (dP, σP) and (dC, σC) space. This type of
intervention could strongly improve the financial stability of euro countries. It
would give rise to an opposite economic environment with respect to that emerging
from the implementation of the fiscal compact. The same is likely to happen in the
overall eurozone in the presence of an ECB that will support future Eurobond issu-
ances financing anti-cyclical federal fiscal policies.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In the aftermath of the 2007–2008 crisis, the incomplete nature of the euro system – as
compared to a fully developed federal union – may have contributed to diverging
trends between central and peripheral member states. In turn, such divergences may
have prompted the austerity-based reforms adopted so far. Fiscal austerity, however,
has obtained disappointing results, and has not interrupted any of the mechanisms
behind the eurozone crisis. Here, we formally show that the creation of a European
federal government and of a government banker likely represent the decisive steps
to solve the current crisis.
The creation of a fully operative monetarily sovereign eurozone federal government
is a far-reaching objective. Accordingly, the ECB’s unlimited bond-buying program
appears to be the most reasonable initiative that policymakers could take to tame
the crisis. This monetary measure presents several shortcomings and alone will not
be enough to restore growth. Full recovery from the ‘Great Recession’ will hardly
take place without considerable expansionary fiscal stances. Nevertheless, it will be
much easier to find room for expansionary stances, both at the national and European
level, in the presence of an interventionist monetary policy that fights financial
speculation.
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APPENDIX A1
Table A1 Sectoral composition and external balance (percentage of GDP), selected eurozone countries.
Austria Netherlands Germany Greece Ireland Portugal Italy Spain
1999 2006 2010 1999 2006 2010 1999 2006 2010 1999 2006 2010 1999 2006 2010 1999 2006 2010 1999 2006 2010 1999 2006 2010
GDP Agriculture 2.1 1.7 1.5 2.7 2.2 1.9 1.2 0.8 0.87 7.1 3.7 3.3 4.0 2.4 2.5 3.8 2.7 2.4 3.0 2.1 1.9 4.5 2.8 2.7
sectoral Industry 30.8 29.7 29.2 24.5 24.6 23.7 30.3 29.9 27.9 20.6 19.4 17.9 40.9 33.7 30.9 29.3 25.4 23.5 28.7 27.2 25.3 29.2 29.8 25.7
structure Manufacturing 20.0 20.0 19.2 15.6 13.9 13.2 22.4 23.3 20.7 10.9 9.6 10.8 33.0 21.6 25.5 17.9 14.3 13.0 21.1 18.7 16.8 18.7 15.5 13.2
Construction 7.8 6.9 6.9 5.5 5.5 5.3 5.5 3.9 4.1 6.8 6.9 4.1 6.6 10.4 3.1 7.9 7.3 6.5 4.9 6.1 6.0 7.9 12.1 10.1
Services 67.0 68.6 69.3 72.8 73.2 74.3 68.5 69.3 71.3 72.3 76.9 78.8 55.1 63.9 66.6 66.9 71.8 74.2 68.3 70.7 72.8 66.3 67.4 71.7
External Exports 42.1 56.4 54.0 63.0 72.8 80.0 29.4 45.5 46.8 21.8 22.9 21.5 88.4 78.9 101.1 27.2 31.0 30.9 24.5 27.7 26.8 26.7 26.3 26.3
balance Imports 40.9 51.3 49.7 58.8 65.1 77.3 28.5 39.9 41.4 32.9 33.7 30.4 74.6 69.3 82.0 37.5 39.7 38.1 22.6 28.6 28.5 28.5 32.7 28.4
data Trade balance 1.2 5.1 4.3 4.2 7.7 2.7 0.9 5.6 5.5 –11.2 –10.8 –8.9 13.7 9.6 19.1 –10.4 –8.7 –7.2 1.9 –0.8 –1.8 –1.9 –6.4 –2.2
Current account –1.6 2.8 3.0 3.8 9.3 1.5 –1.3 6.3 6.1 –5.2 –11.3 –10.0 0.3 –3.5 0.3 –8.7 –10.7 –10.0 0.7 –2.6 –3.5 –2.9 –9.0 –4.6
Source: UNCTAD Trade Tables (2012).
Table A2 Macroeconomic data in selected eurozone countries and other advanced economies (all variables in percentage of GDP)
Austria Netherlands Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain UK US
Ω+id d g Ω+id d g Ω+id d g Ω+id d g Ω+id d g Ω+id d g Ω+id d g Ω+id d g Ω+id d g Ω+id d g
2007 −1.0 60.2 3.7 0.1 45.3 3.9 0.2 65.2 3.4 −6.7 105.4 3.0 0.1 24.8 5.2 −1.5 103.1 1.7 −3.2 68.3 2.4 1.9 36.3 3.5 −2.8 43.7 3.6 −2.7 67.2 1.9
2008 −1.0 63.8 1.4 0.3 58.5 1.8 −0.1 66.7 0.6 −9.7 110.7 −0.1 −7.3 44.2 −3.0 −2.7 105.8 −1.2 −3.7 71.6 0.0 −4.2 40.2 0.6 −5.1 52.2 −1.0 −6.7 76.1 −0.3
2009 −4.1 69.5 −3.8 −5.6 60.8 −3.5 −3.2 74.4 −5.1 −15.6 127.1 −3.3 −14.2 65.2 −7.0 −5.4 116.1 −5.5 −10.2 83.1 −2.9 −11.2 53.9 −3.7 −10.3 68.0 −4.0 −13.3 89.7 −3.1
2010 −4.5 71.8 2.3 −5.1 62.9 1.6 −4.3 83.2 3.6 −10.6 142.8 −3.5 −31.3 92.5 −0.4 −4.5 118.7 1.8 −9.8 93.4 1.4 −9.3 61.2 −0.1 −9.9 75.0 1.8 −11.6 98.6 2.4
2011 −2.6 72.2 3.1 −5.0 66.2 1.3 −1.0 81.5 3.1 −9.2 163.3 −6.9 −9.9 105.0 0.5 −3.9 120.1 0.3 −4.0 106.8 −1.5 −8.5 68.5 0.5 −8.6 82.0 0.8 −10.1 102.9 1.8
2012 −2.9* 74.3* 0.9* −3.7 68.2 −0.5 −0.4* 83* 1* −7.5* 170.7* −6.0* −8.3* 118.0* 0.4* −2.7* 126.3* −2.3* −5.0* 119.0* −3.0* −7.0* 90.7* −1.5* −8.3* 88.7* −0.4* −8.7* 107.2* 2.8*
Notes: Ω+id: overall public deficit; d: debt-to-GDP ratio; g: annual real GDP growth rate (negative values in grey); * = estimated data.
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Figure A1 Current account balance (percentage of GDP), selected euro countries
and other advanced economies, 1999–2012
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Figure A2 Public deficit (percentage of GDP), selected euro countries and other
advanced economies, 1999–2012
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Figure A3 Debt-to-GDP ratio index, selected euro countries and other advanced
economies, 1999–2012 (1999 = base year)
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Figure A4 Asymmetric reaction of financial markets in the aftermath of the 2007–
2008 financial meltdown, peripheral euro countries, central economies, and other
advanced economies (UK and US)
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APPENDIX A2
The Jacobian matrix JC emerging from Equations (7)–(8) reads:
JC ¼
∂ _dC
∂dC
∂ _dC
∂σC
∂ _σC
∂dC
∂ _σC
∂σC
26664
37775¼
¼
dC
∂ΩC
∂dC
% &
dC−ΩC
d2C
− ð1þψÞ
∂gC
∂dC
2664
3775
−=þ
dC 1þ
∂ΩC
∂gC
% &
∂gC
∂σC
% &
dC
− ð1þψÞ
∂gC
∂σC
2664
3775
þ
β
þ
−β
∂dC
∂d%C
∂d%C
∂σC
−
2666666666666664
3777777777777775
:
In matrix JC, the top-right partial derivative ð
∂ _dC
∂σC
Þ is positive. First, the higher σC is,
the higher the interest rate iC, the debt service costs, and the overall public deficit will
be. Accordingly, new bonds’ issuances, hence _dC , will be larger. Second, note that a
higher σC hampers current growth gC through the interest-rate–investment nexus, thus
adding further instability to the dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio.
According to our formalization of financial markets’ behaviors, also ð∂ _σC
∂dC
Þ is posi-
tive. Ceteris paribus, a higher debt-to-GDP ratio dC will induce financial operators to
revise the country-risk factor σC upward.
The partial derivative ð∂ _σC
∂σC
Þ is negative. Ceteris paribus, the higher the country-risk
factor σC is, the higher the long-run debt-to-GDP ratio d
%
C will be. In times of financial
tranquility, with εP = 0, this will tame financial operators’ pressures to further revise
σC upward. Eventually, self-stabilizing dynamics characterize the evolution of the
country-risk factor. The higher σC, the more difficult it is that it will newly increase
next time.
The partial derivative ð∂ _dC=∂dCÞ deserves a more detailed analysis, since its sign is
uncertain. More formally, we have:
∂ _dC
∂dC
¼
dC
∂ΩC
∂GC
∂GC
∂dC
þ ∂ΩC
∂θC
∂θC
∂dC
þ ∂ΩC
∂gC
∂gC
∂dC
# $h i
−ΩC
d2C
− ð1þ ψÞ
∂gC
∂dC
% &
with ∂GC
∂dC
# $
≤ 0; ∂θC
∂dC
# $
≥ 0;
∂gC
∂dC
# $
¼ ∂gC
∂GC
# $
∂GC
∂dC
# $
þ ∂gC
∂θC
# $
∂θC
∂dC
# $h i
≤ 0.
Assume, reasonably, that there is no need for fiscal restrictions when the debt-to-
GDP ratio is close to zero, so that ∂GC
∂dC
# $
¼ ∂θC
∂dC
# $
¼ 0. Consider also that, consistent
with the European rules on fiscal management, in such a safe scenario there is room to
run primary fiscal deficits (a positive value of ΩC), and that the debt-to-GDP ratio
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doesn’t bear any effect on the growth rate gC. Assume, finally, that opposite instances
would prevail in the case of a much higher debt-to-GDP ratio. In light of these facts,
the computation of the limits of ∂
_dC
∂dC
# $
for dC→0 and dC→∝ demonstrates that:
lim
dC ! 0
∂ _dC
∂dC
% &
¼
−ΩC
d2C
¼ −∞
lim
dC ! ∞
∂ _dC
∂dC
% &
¼ lim
dC ! ∞
∂ΩC
∂dC
h i
dC
−
ΩC
d2C
8<:
9=;− limdC ! ∞ ð1þ ψÞ ∂gC∂dC
% &' (
> 0:
From an economic point of view, what emerges is that the management of public
indebtedness is likely to be easy as long as the debt-to-GDP ratio is low. In such a con-
text, even in the presence of primary fiscal deficits, economic growth may keep the
debt-to-GDP ratio stable and under control. By contrast, debt management gets
increasingly complex in the case of a high debt-to-GDP ratio dC. Actually, tough fiscal
policies which produce large primary surpluses may prove to be useless in stabilizing
dC, due to the recessive effects they produce of economic activity. Eventually, the
dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio could likely turn out to be unstable.
APPENDIX A3
Let us take into consideration the dynamic system composed by Equations (7)–(10) in
order to analyse center–periphery dynamics in the case of big economies. The corre-
sponding four-by-four Jacobian matrix JC/BP is:
JC=BP ¼
∂ _dC
∂dC
∂ _dC
∂σC
∂ _σC
∂dC
∂ _σC
∂σC
∂ _dC
∂dP
∂ _dC
∂σP
∂ _σC
∂dP
∂ _σC
∂σP
∂ _dP
∂dC
∂ _dP
∂σC
∂ _σP
∂dC
∂ _σP
∂σC
∂ _dP
∂dP
∂ _dP
∂σP
∂ _σP
∂dP
∂ _σP
∂σP
2666666666666664
3777777777777775
:
The list of equations below states the partial derivatives (evaluated at the steady
state) contained in matrix JC/BP. We get:
∂ _dC
∂dC
¼ dC
' ∂ΩC
∂dC
# $
dC −ΩC
d2
C
− ð1þ ψÞ ∂gC
∂dC
(
with ∂
_dC
∂dC
< 0 when dC → 0 and
∂ _dC
∂dC
> 0 when
dC → ∝.
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∂ _dC
∂σC
¼ dC 1þ
∂ΩC
∂gC
# $
∂gC
∂σC
# $
dC
− ð1þ ψÞ ∂gC
∂σC
24 35> 0
∂ _dC
∂dP
¼ dC
"
∂ΩC
∂gC
# $
∂gC
∂gP
# $
∂gP
∂dP
# $
dC
− ð1þ ψÞ
∂gC
∂EXC
∂EXC
∂EXC ! BP
∂EXC ! BP
∂gP
∂gP
∂dP
#
≥ 0
∂ _dC
∂σP
¼ dC
∂ΩC
∂gC
# $
∂gC
∂σP
# $
dC
− ð1þ ψÞ ∂gC
∂PT
P
∂PTP
∂iP
∂iP
∂σP
24 35> 0
∂ _σC
∂dC
¼ β> 0
∂ _σC
∂σC
¼ − β ∂dC
∂d%
C
∂d%
C
∂σC
< 0
∂ _σC
∂dP
¼ 0
∂ _σC
∂σP
¼ 0
∂ _dP
∂dC
¼ dP
∂ΩP
∂gP
# $
∂gP
∂gC
# $
∂gC
∂dC
# $
dP
− ð1þ χÞ ∂gP
∂EXP
∂EXP
∂EXBP ! C
∂EXBP ! C
∂gC
∂gC
∂dC
24 35≥ 0
∂ _dP
∂σC
¼ dP
∂ΩP
∂gP
# $
∂gP
∂σC
# $
dP
− ð1þ χÞ ∂gP
∂PT
C
∂PT
C
∂iC
∂iC
∂σC
24 35≥ 0
∂ _dP
∂dP
¼ dP
∂ΩP
∂dP
# $
dP −ΩP
d2
P
− ð1þ χÞ ∂gP
∂dP
24 35 with ∂ _dP
∂dP
< 0 when dP → 0 and
∂ _dP
∂dP
> 0 when
dP → ∝.
∂ _dP
∂σP
¼ dP 1þ
∂ΩP
∂gP
# $
∂gP
∂σP
# $
dP
− ð1þ χÞ ∂gP
∂σP
24 35> 0
∂ _σP
∂dC
¼ 0
∂ _σP
∂σC
¼ 0
∂ _σP
∂dP
¼ δ> 0
∂ _σP
∂σP
¼ − δ ∂dP
∂d%
P
∂d%P
∂σP
< 0:
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According to the derivatives’ signs, we’re dealing with a Metzlerian matrix.
Following Gandolfo (1996), a necessary and sufficient condition for stability requires
upper-left minor principals of matrix JC/BP to alternate in sign, starting with a minus
sign associated with ð∂ _dC=∂dCÞ. Depending on the various signs that some of the
above derivatives can assume, several scenarios exist. The above stability condition
will be immediately violated in the case of a high debt-to-GDP ratio in the center,
such that ð∂ _dC=∂dCÞ> 0. Let’s thus consider the simplest and, say, safest scenario pos-
sible in which both the center and the periphery present low values of their own debt-
to-GDP ratios, so that: ð∂ _dC=∂dCÞ< 0 and ð∂ _dP=∂dPÞ< 0; ð∂ _dC=∂dPÞ ¼ 0 and
ð∂ _dP=∂dCÞ ¼ 0. In this context, we get:
jJ1C=BPj ¼ j∂
_dC=∂dCj< 0
jJ2C=BPj ¼ jJCj> 0
jJ3C=BPj ¼ ð∂
_dP=∂dPÞjJCj< 0
jJC=BPj ¼
∂ _dC
∂dC
∂ _σC
∂σC
∂ _dP
∂dP
∂ _dP
∂σP
∂ _σP
∂dP
∂ _σP
∂σP
)))))))))
)))))))))
−
∂ _σC
∂dC
∂ _dC
∂σC
∂ _dP
∂dP
∂ _dP
∂σP
∂ _σP
∂dP
∂ _σP
∂σP
)))))))))
)))))))))
−
∂ _dP
∂σC
−
∂ _σP
∂dP
∂ _dC
∂σP
% &
8>><>>:
9>>=>>;
¼ jJCjjJPj− βδ
∂ _dP
∂σC
∂ _dC
∂σP
% &
≷ 0: (13)
From Equation (13), the sign of jJC=BPj can be either positive or negative. In the
first case, the dynamic system is locally stable. Otherwise, instability arises. Accord-
ingly, in a center–big periphery scenario, stability is not guaranteed even in the safest
scenario possible featuring low debt-to-GDP ratios in both the economies.
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